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INTRODUCTION
Today, the concept of the “independent” director is widely, if
not universally, regarded as critical to the healthy governance of
public corporations.1 The concept remains fiercely contested, however,
in the governance of investment companies, including mutual funds.2
This resistance appears on two fronts, one of which is quite visible,
while the other is often overlooked. The more obvious battle over
director independence has occurred in response to the Securities and
Exchange Commission’s (“SEC’s”) rulemaking effort to alter the
standard for granting certain regulatory privileges under the
Investment Company Act (the “Act”).3 The SEC, among its other
reforms, sought to limit privileges under the Act to companies where
at least seventy-five percent of the directors and the board chairman
are independent.4 Those rulemaking efforts have been struck down
twice on procedural grounds.5 In late 2006, the SEC resolicited public
comment on two studies addressing the costs and benefits of the
proposals.6

1.
E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 19502005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).
2.
Judith Burns, SEC to Revisit Independence Rule, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2006, at C13
(noting opposition of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce and the Investment Company Institute to a
proposed SEC rule requiring an independent chair of mutual fund boards).
3.
Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69
Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,380-81 (Aug. 2, 2004) (promulgating rules conditioning exemptions from the
Act’s requirements for mutual funds with an independent chair and with at least seventy-five
percent of the fund’s directors being independent of the fund’s investment adviser). The proposed
rule was adopted by a 3-2 vote of the SEC Commissioners. Id. at 46,390-93 (dissenting opinion).
4.
Id. The SEC also proposed conditioning exemptions on independent directors holding
quarterly “executive sessions” separate from the full board and having authority to hire staff
(including legal counsel) to support them in discharging their responsibilities. Id. at 46,384-85.
5.
Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that SEC’s
re-adoption of the rule violated the Administrative Procedures Act by failing to afford
opportunity for public comment on certain data used in estimating costs of complying with
proposed rule); Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 143-45 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding
that SEC violated Administrative Procedures Act by failing to determine costs of its proposed
conditions and by failing to address a proposed alternative to the independent chair proposal).
6.
Request for Additional Comment, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,600, 71 Fed.
Reg. 76,618, 76,618 (Dec. 21, 2006) (permitting public comment until March 2, 2007, on two
papers prepared by the SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis addressing the costs of complying with
the conditions in the proposed rule). The December 2006 action by the SEC reopened the
comment period that was first opened in June 2006. Id.; Investment Company Governance,
Request for Additional Comment, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,395, 71 Fed. Reg.
35,366, 35,366 (June 19, 2006).
On February 5, 2007, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce filed a Freedom of Information Act
petition seeking information pertaining to the studies, including information concerning the
decision to undertake the studies, the methodologies used in the studies, and data pertaining to
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Mutual fund fee litigation is the second area in investment
company governance where, in striking contrast to the trend in
corporate governance generally, the concept of director independence
remains undeveloped. Section 36(b) of the Act deems an investment
adviser of an investment company to owe a fiduciary duty with respect
to the receipt of compensation for advisory services (i.e., management
compensation).7 That section also creates an express, private right of
action permitting a security holder, acting on behalf of the investment
company, to sue the investment adviser or its affiliates for breach of
that duty.8 The seminal section 36(b) case, decided twenty-five years
ago, is Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc.9 The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
complaint10 and articulated six factors (“Gartenberg factors”) to guide
the determination whether an investment adviser’s fee is excessive.11
One factor is the independence of fund directors.12 The independence
factor, however, has not played a meaningful role in judicial analysis
of advisory fees under the Act.13 As to scope, it has been regarded,
unlike developments in corporate law, as essentially equivalent to a
director falling outside the narrow statutory definition of
“interestedness” found in section 2(a)(19) of the Act.14 Moreover, of 150
earlier drafts or edits of the two papers. Kara Scannell, Chamber Wants Data Behind SEC
Studies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2007, at C7.
As of February 21, 2008, the SEC has not yet reissued a rule on independence.
7.
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2000).
Compensation paid to the investment adviser is analogous to the “executive compensation” paid
to officers by corporations. This is because mutual funds do not have “internal” management;
instead, they “contract” with an external adviser for such services. See infra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text.
8.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b). The SEC may also bring an action. Id. See generally 4 TAMAR
FRANKEL & ANN TAYLOR SCHWING, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS: MUTUAL FUNDS AND
ADVISERS § 34.03 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing case law under section 36(b)).
9.
694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
10. Id. at 925.
11. Id. at 929-30; accord Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors, Inc., 464 F.3d 338, 340-41
(2d Cir. 2006).
12. Id.
13. See infra Part III.C.
14. Id.; see also Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)
(defining “interested person”); Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment
in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 170 (2006) (“The definition of
‘interested person’ makes it relatively easy to seat outside directors sympathetic to management
firm interests.”). For a critique of mutual fund director independence focusing on the failure to
consider the relevance of professional relationships, see Larry D. Barnett, When is a Mutual
Fund Director Independent? The Unexplored Role of Professional Relationships Under Section
2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act, 4 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 155 (2006). For a
description of how “independence” both has been broadened in scope and has become central to
Delaware’s analytical approach to fiduciary duty issues, see infra Part IV.
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reported cases citing Gartenberg since 1982, only thirty mention the
narrowed notion of director independence, with few according it much
significance.15 Not surprisingly, then, in the twenty-five years since
Gartenberg, no plaintiff ever has obtained a reported judgment under
section 36(b).16
In contrast, over the last quarter of a century, the concept of
director independence has traced a very different path in the larger
world of corporate governance.17 Here the concept has expanded,
flourished, and generally taken hold as a critical component of
fiduciary analysis. This is not to say the judiciary’s actual handling of
the independence issue in particular factual settings is always
commendable.18 Rather, the point is that director independence is
accepted as an indispensable element of good governance in corporate
law, and the concept is open textured and fluid.19 In the area of
mutual fund fee litigation, on the other hand, the concept has
remained cramped in scope and marginal in significance.
This Article takes a fresh look at director independence in the
mutual fund fee context and offers a proposal for reinvigorating it.
Part I briefly identifies the central agency conflict between mutual
fund investors and investment advisers and highlights the economic
significance of mutual fund fees. Part II summarizes strategies to
15. See infra Part III.C.
16. James D. Cox & John W. Payne, Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral
Perspective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 907, 923 (2005) (“[P]laintiffs are still seeking to achieve their first
victory under section 36(b).”). See generally John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund
Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609 (2001) (reviewing litigation
under section 36(b)).
17. See infra Part IV.
18. For recent critiques of how Delaware courts have interpreted the independence factor in
specific contexts, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: “Independent” Directors
and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53 (2006); Harvey Gelb, Corporate
Governance and the Independence Myth, 6 WYO. L. REV. 129 (2006). For other good discussions of
recent developments in independence in Delaware law, see Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of
the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73 (2007); Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley,
Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of Federal Reforms on State Director
Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381 (2005); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di
Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004? A
Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399 (2005).
19. See Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 BUS. LAW. 1375,
1376 n.4 (describing Delaware’s corporate law definition of independence as “more nuanced”).
Independence has not been without its critics, it should be noted. Professor Victor Brudney made
a strong critique in 1982, and others subsequently have echoed his opinion. Victor Brudney, The
Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 617-19 (1982);
see Palmiter, supra note 14, at 202-03 (proposing regulatory options to replace a board-centered
approach); Wallace Wen Yen Wang, Corporate Versus Contractual Mutual Funds: An Evaluation
of Structure and Governance, 69 WASH. L. REV. 927, 1008 (1994) (“[B]ecause directors are not
truly independent, they are vulnerable to coalition politics.”).
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minimize the adverse effects of these conflicts. One such strategy,
competition, suffers from weaknesses aptly noted by Professor Donald
Langevoort,20 such as a lack of activist institutional investors
exercising influence through voting rights as typically seen in the
corporate arena. The second strategy, regulation, essentially has failed
on the section 36(b) litigation front.
Part III begins by summarizing the emerging and somewhat
inconclusive empirical evidence on the relationship between mutual
fund director independence and mutual fund advisory fees. It suggests
that an exceedingly narrow definition of “independence” is to blame
for the failure to identify a strong connection between director
independence and the size of advisory fees. When the independence
inquiry is broadened beyond the Act’s statutory definition to examine
past or present business relationships between mutual fund directors
and advisers or subadvisers, Professor Camelia Kuhnen’s recent study
finds that such relationships correlate with higher fees.21 In short,
fiduciary discourse in the mutual fund industry is hobbled (to the
advantage of investment advisers) by a flawed vocabulary. Language
matters, and insiders, with regulatory acquiescence, have captured
the terms of the debate, linguistically deploying what this Article calls
“ostensible independence” as a counterfeit for genuine independence.
Part III then takes a critical look at Gartenberg as a prelude to the
reinterpretation of section 36(b) that is offered in Part V. Part III also
summarizes salient empirical data on outcomes in mutual fund fee
litigation under section 36(b) since Gartenberg and highlights the
scant dispositive role played by director independence in judicial
analysis. To provide a reference point for assessing this path
dependent status of independence in the mutual fund industry, Part
IV chronicles the dramatic expansion of director independence in
corporate law generally over the same twenty-five year period.
Finally, Part V offers a proposal for according director
independence a more prominent role in section 36(b) fee litigation. The
proposal does not necessitate congressional action—although a more
robust definition of genuine independence would clarify matters.
Instead, it offers a new way to understand the text of section 36(b)
that is informed by the quite different trajectories traced by the notion
of independence in the mutual fund and corporate governance areas
20. Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds:
Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1017 (2005).
21. Camelia M. Kuhnen, Social Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the
Mutual Fund Industry 18-28 (Mar. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt
Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=849705.
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since 1982. The proposed reading builds on and seeks to implement
Professor Langevoort’s and Professor Frankel’s calls for a stronger
norm of fiduciary responsibility in adviser fee litigation and contract
negotiation under the Act.22 Langevoort argues for a strengthened
fiduciary norm because he finds analogizing mutual fund governance
to market-based approaches to corporate governance to be inapt for
various reasons.23 The proposal advanced in Part V of this Article
argues, ironically, that to rectify what Langevoort rightly considers
inappropriate mutual fund “borrowing” from corporate law as a
strategy to resist tighter oversight, judges should borrow even more
from corporate law in section 36(b) fee litigation—specifically, they
should borrow an enriched notion of director independence with real
procedural significance, thereby bolstering section 36(b) as a credible
sanction for excessive fees. This Article concludes with some
reflections on the mutual fund industry’s resistance to independence
and on the role of private litigation as a key ingredient in any
regulatory strategy for mutual funds.
I. CONFLICTS BETWEEN MUTUAL FUND INVESTORS AND INVESTMENT
ADVISERS
Late trading,24 market timing,25 and other abusive practices in
the mutual fund industry have attracted widespread attention.26
These practices have engendered various proposals for reform and
reignited debate about how best, or whether,27 to regulate further the

22. Tamar Frankel, How Did We Get into this Mess?, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 133 (2006);
Langevoort, supra note 20.
23. Langevoort, supra note 20.
24. For a description of this practice, see William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An
Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1458-60
(2006).
25. For a description of this practice, see id. at 1453-56. For an in-depth analysis, see
Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual Funds: Market
Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235 (2006).
26. For a full description of various regulatory responses to the mutual fund scandals, see
Laurin B. Kleiman & Carla G. Teodoro, Forming, Organizing and Operating a Mutual Fund:
Legal and Practical Considerations, in THE ABCS OF MUTUAL FUNDS 11, 49-56 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 8455, 2006), WL 1550 PLI/Corp. 11. See generally
Conference, The $7 Trillion Question: Mutual Funds & Investor Welfare, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1
(2006) (providing transcripts of discussions and essays from a conference on late trading, market
timing, front running, and related topics held at the University of Maryland School of Law
through the Business Law Program).
27. Some commentators do not favor increased regulation. See, e.g., Paul Mahoney,
Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 161, 179-80 (2004); Larry E.
Ribstein, Do the Mutuals Need More Law?, 27 REGULATION 14 (2004).
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mutual fund industry.28 While the exposed practices are significant
and disturbing, they did not cost investors nearly as much as
substantial, ongoing management fees.29 As noted by financial
commentators, payments for management services “are the largest
expenses of most funds.”30 The SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis
(“OEA”) recently observed that lower advisory fees are a “critical
determinant of long-term fund performance”31 and cited a study
showing that differences in expenses and transaction costs explain
most of the difference in average and risk-adjusted returns across
mutual funds over time.32 In short, fees paid to investment advisers
are quite large in absolute dollar terms and can affect dramatically
overall rates of return.
The management structure of investment companies
inherently creates a significant conflict between investor and adviser
interests,33 presenting a classic agency problem with respect to mutual
fund fees. The investment company obtains funds from investors (and
issues securities in return) and has a board of directors, much like
other companies. Management of investment company assets,
however, is not provided internally but by an external investment
adviser pursuant to an advisory contract negotiated and approved by
the fund’s board of directors.34 Frequently, the adviser establishes and
“sponsors” the investment company and provides all necessary
personnel, facilities, and expertise. The company essentially is a pool
of portfolio securities, options, futures, loans, cash, or cash

28. E.g., Mercer E. Bullard, The Mutual Fund As a Firm: Frequent Trading, Fund
Arbitrage and the SEC’s Response to the Mutual Fund Scandal, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 1271 (2006);
Thomas R. Hurst, The Unfinished Business of Mutual Fund Reform, 26 PACE L. REV. 133 (2005);
Donna M. Nagy, Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 11
(2006).
29. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1018-19 (“The broader issues involve fiduciary
responsibility across a wide range of matters including management fees, distribution expenses,
brokerage commissions, and the like.”).
30. Diane Del Guercio et al., Governance and Boards of Directors in Closed-End Investment
Companies, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 111, 112 (2003).
31. Memorandum from Chester Spatt, Chief Economist, Office of Economic Analysis, SEC,
to Inv. Co. File S7-03-04, at 10 (Dec. 29, 2006) [hereinafter OEA Study] (providing a review of
literature on mutual fund governance), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/
oeamemo122906-litreview.pdf.
32. Id. (citing M. Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 57-82
(1997)).
33. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979) (recognizing “the potential for abuse inherent
in the structure of investment companies”).
34. Section 15(c) of the Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 requires that the
advisory contract be approved annually by a majority of the directors on the fund’s board and by
a majority of the “noninterested” directors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2000).

JOHNSON_PAGE

504

3/25/2008 9:40:58 AM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2:497

equivalents.35 This arrangement has led some, including former SEC
Chairman Harvey Pitt, to describe mutual funds as “products,” not
companies.36 For the most part, the investment adviser runs the
company and, for a variety of reasons, stands in a dominant and
controlling position with respect to the fund.37 Notwithstanding the
adviser’s strong position, directors of the company are supposed to
negotiate the advisory contract on behalf of investor interests and, in
the words of the Supreme Court, serve as ongoing “watchdogs” over all
adviser activities.38
The advisory contract typically charges a fee based on a
percentage of assets managed and not on fund performance.39
Investors benefit from a lower percentage while the adviser obviously
prefers a higher percentage. Moreover, advisers have an incentive to
maximize assets under management because that raises the aggregate
fee even when the performance of the fund falters. Investors gain only
by enhanced fund performance—i.e., higher returns, lower expenses,
or both.
Academic literature has identified several conflicts between
mutual fund investors and advisers. These include differences in
financial incentives, differences in investor and adviser risk
tolerances, and cross-subsidization of funds in a fund complex.40 A
simple illustration of the first, drawn from the recent OEA study,
highlights the problem:
New mutual fund investments are highly sensitive to published reports of annual
performance. Because greater performance implies greater net fund inflows and greater
net inflows imply greater management fees, managers may alter the risk of the fund to

35. Zell v. InterCapital Income Sec., Inc., 675 F.2d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1982); Birdthistle,
supra note 24, at 1409-10.
36. Harvey L. Pitt, Over-Lawyered at the SEC, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2006, at A15 (“[The
Act] treats mutual funds as companies when the economic reality is that they are products.”).
For a critique of such a viewpoint, see Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1037 (“Once the mutual
fund is viewed as a product to be marketed . . . then any notion that the producer is a ‘fiduciary’
is awkward and disorienting.”).
37. The SEC has expressed its concern that “many boards continue to be dominated by their
management companies.” Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381 (July 27, 2004).
38. Burks, 441 U.S. at 485 (stating that disinterested directors are to serve as “‘watchdogs’
to protect shareholder interests”). Perhaps the court chose the wrong canine metaphor, as noted
in an old Chancery decision, In re Kingston Cotton Mill Co. (No. 2), [1896] 2 Ch. 279, 280, 287
(Ct. App.) (appeal taken from Ch.D.) (describing a watchdog’s role as requiring a reaction only
when there is something to “arouse [its] suspicion”). In contrast, a bloodhound’s role is that of
“approach[ing] [its] work with suspicion or with a foregone conclusion that there is something
wrong.” Steven Schwarcz, Financial Information Failure and Lawyer Responsibility, 31 J. CORP.
L. 1097, 1119 n.148 (2006).
39. OEA Study, supra note 31, at 5.
40. Id. at 5-7 (describing conflicts and academic literature).
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indirectly maximize their own compensation. If a fund is ahead of expectations halfway
into the reporting period, managers may “pull back” from the strategy preferred by
investors and reduce the risk of the portfolio in order to lock-in the present level of
returns, attract more assets and maximize fees from investors. Conversely, if the fund is
underperforming during the year, managers may be tempted to “gamble” and increase
the risk of the portfolio to try and catch up to the market so they can minimize the
impact on fees.41

The structural-financial conflict illustrated above is
exacerbated by another common feature of investment companies:
officers and employees of the investment adviser frequently serve on
the investment company’s board of directors. As members of the
investment company board, they owe a duty of loyalty to fund
investors. As decisionmakers for the adviser, however, they both
personally benefit from and are in a position to influence a contract
that is good for the adviser but adverse to the interests of investors.
This evident conflict of interest is compounded by investors’ inability
to observe directly or influence the adviser.
II. STRATEGIES TO MINIMIZE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF CONFLICTS
A. Competition
Certain factors, as a theoretical matter, might serve to align
investor and adviser interests without regulatory (or at least without
additional regulatory) intervention. For example, the mutual fund
industry is said to be competitive with more than 8,600 funds in
existence at the end of 2004.42 Advisers seeking to preserve and
enhance their reputations to attract greater fund inflows and facilitate
their own advancement in the adviser labor market have an incentive
to perform well on behalf of investors.43 Investors’ ability to redeem
mutual fund shares at net asset value also may impose discipline on
fund managers because investors can exit the fund without
dampening the price of fund shares.44 These factors lead some, such as
41. Id. at 5 (citing literature); see also Jeff D. Opdyke, Mutual Funds Avoid Risk to Lift
Ratings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2007, at D2 (describing Goldman Sachs study indicating that
large-company equity mutual funds sidestep risk to reduce price volatility and gain higher
Morningstar ratings so as to attract and retain assets under management).
42. INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 3 (45th ed. 2005); John C. Coates IV
& R. Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry: Evidence and Implications for
Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 157 (2007) (“In 2006, there were over 8,000 mutual funds . . . .”).
43. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 42, at 210; OEA Study, supra note 31, at 7.
44. Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87 B.U.
L. REV. 1021 (2007) (finding that investors who made significant withdrawals from mutual funds
and mutual fund families found that fund managers had engaged in wrongdoing); Coates &
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Professor Paul Mahoney and Professors John Coates and Glenn
Hubbard,45 to argue for a strategy of enhancing competition as a
means for reducing the adverse effects of investor-adviser conflicts.
As noted in the recent OEA study, however, several constraints
may inhibit the effectiveness of competitive forces in mitigating
conflicts between investors and advisers.46 These include lack of
investor knowledge about management and how to assess managerial
skill; high search and switching costs in fund selection; tax
considerations on selling shares; and reliance on reputation, trends,
and recommendations. These constraints demonstrate substantial
shortcomings in a strategy relying only on market forces to align
investor and adviser interests.47 For example, one study found that
Morningstar rankings are inaccurate predictors of future fund
performance.48 Moreover, Professor Langevoort has identified several
other ways in which market forces, possibly at work to some degree in
corporate law, are lacking in the mutual fund industry.49 Salient
differences include the lack of stock or stock option grants to align
investor and management interests, the absence of active institutional
investors advocating governance reforms, the absence (at least in
mutual funds, though not in closed-end funds) of a market for
corporate control (i.e., no hostile takeovers), and manager
compensation based on the value of assets (i.e., size, not
performance).50 Overall, these features may lead to mutual fund
assets being “sticky,” rather than mobile, as market theory posits.51
Hubbard, supra note 42, at 162; OEA Study, supra note 31, at 8. This discipline does not operate
on managers of closed-end funds.
45. Mahoney, supra note 27; Coates & Hubbard, supra note 42.
46. OEA Study, supra note 31, at 8-10.
47. Id.; see also Freeman & Brown, supra note 16, at 651 (“[A]dvisers refuse to compete
against each other for advisory business . . . .”).
48. Christopher R. Blake & Matthew R. Morey, Morningstar Ratings and Mutual Fund
Performance, 35 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 451 (2000) (noting exceptions for low-rated
funds); see Remarks of Professor Alan Palmiter, Conference, The $7 Trillion Question: Mutual
Funds & Investor Welfare, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 23, 26 (2006) (“[T]he [Morningstar] rating is a
very powerful predictor of future performance—but negatively!”); see also supra note 41 and
accompanying text.
49. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1031-32.
50. Id.
51. OEA Study, supra note 31, at 9. Coates and Hubbard recently have sought to rebut
certain of these claims that competition is lacking in the mutual fund industry. Coates &
Hubbard, supra note 42. They note:
[Much of our] evidence on competition is general—we present evidence on market
structure and investor sensitivity for the overall fund industry, and for general
investment styles, but we do not attempt to present the multiple, extensive, detailed
analyses that would be needed to investigate every subsector and competitively
distinct niche within the mutual fund industry.
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B. Regulation
Since the adoption of the Act in 1940, regulation has been a key
strategy in addressing investor-adviser conflicts in the mutual fund
industry.52 The Act, unlike state corporate law, substantively
regulates several aspects of investment company governance. The
statutory provisions are designed to supplement, rather than preempt,
state law, at least “to the extent such law is consistent with the
policies of the [Investment Company Act].”53 For example, state law
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty continue to govern fund directors.
The mutual fund board of directors is the governance centerpiece of
the federal regulatory strategy. The board must negotiate and approve
the critical advisory contract,54 and, in theory, the board oversees all
fund affairs to ensure that its adviser complies with the Act’s various
provisions.
Two key sections of the Act designed to safeguard investor
interests in relation to advisers are sections 15(c) and 36(b),55 the
latter having been added in 1970.56 Section 15(c) requires approval of
the terms of the advisory contract, initially or as renewed, by the vote,
cast in person, of a majority of directors who are not parties to the
contract or “interested persons” of any such party.57 The term
“interested person” is defined in section 2(a)(19) of the Act.58

Id. at 206. They go on to acknowledge the continuing importance of section 36(b). Id.
52. Regulation is not a purely market-based policy approach. For a good overview, see
Palmiter, supra note 14, at 167-71.
53. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979). Mutual funds typically are organized as
corporations, often under Maryland law, or as business trusts, often under Massachusetts law.
FED. REGULATION OF SEC. COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, FUND DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK 4 (3d ed. 2006).
State law principles continue to apply, subject to preemption where they are inconsistent with
the policies of the Act. Id.
54. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (2000).
55. Id. §§ 80a-15(c), -35(b).
56. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b).
57. Id. § 80a-15(c). Prior to the 1970 amendments, rather than the term “interested person,”
the Act used the term “affiliated” person. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 538
(1984).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) provides as follows:
“Interested person” of another person means . . .
(B) when used with respect to an investment adviser of or principal underwriter for
any investment company—
(i) any affiliated person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter,
(ii) any member of the immediate family of any natural person who is an affiliated
person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter,
(iii) any person who knowingly has any direct or indirect beneficial interest in, or who
is designated as trustee, executor, or guardian of any legal interest in, any security
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In mutual fund parlance, a director who is not an “interested
person,” as defined in section 2(a)(19) of the Act, typically is described
as “independent.”59 This deeply ingrained rhetorical practice began in
issued either by such investment adviser or principal underwriter or by a controlling
person of such investment adviser or principal underwriter,
(iv) any person or partner or employee of any person who at any time since the
beginning of the last two completed fiscal years of such investment company has acted
as legal counsel for such investment adviser or principal underwriter,
(v) any person or any affiliated person of a person (other than a registered investment
company) that, at any time during the 6-month period preceding the date of the
determination of whether that person or affiliated person is an interested person, has
executed any portfolio transactions for, engaged in any principal transactions with, or
distributed shares for—
(I) any investment company for which the investment adviser or principal underwriter
serves as such;
(II) any investment company holding itself out to investors, for purposes of investment
or investor services, as a company related to any investment company for which the
investment adviser or principal underwriter serves as such; or
(III) any account over which the investment adviser has brokerage placement
discretion,
(vi) any person or any affiliated person of a person (other than a registered investment
company) that, at any time during the 6-month period preceding the date of the
determination of whether that person or affiliated person is an interested person, has
loaned money or other property to—
(I) any investment company for which the investment adviser or principal underwriter
serves as such;
(II) any investment company holding itself out to investors, for purposes of investment
or investor services, as a company related to any investment company for which the
investment adviser or principal underwriter serves as such; or
(III) any account for which the investment adviser has borrowing authority,
(vii) any natural person whom the Commission by order shall have determined to be
an interested person by reason of having had at any time since the beginning of the
last two completed fiscal years of such investment company a material business or
professional relationship with such investment adviser or principal underwriter or
with the principal executive officer or any controlling person of such investment
adviser or principal underwriter.
For the purposes of this paragraph (19), “member of the immediate family” means
any parent, spouse of a parent, child, spouse of a child, spouse, brother, or sister, and
includes step and adoptive relationships. The Commission may modify or revoke any
order issued under clause (vii) of subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph whenever
it finds that such order is no longer consistent with the facts. No order issued
pursuant to clause (vii) of subparagraph (A) or (B) of this paragraph shall become
effective until at least sixty days after the entry thereof, and no such order shall affect
the status of any person for the purposes of this subchapter or for any other purpose
for any period prior to the effective date of such order.
59. See Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1210 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, 441 U.S. 471 (1979)
(“[S]tatutorily disinterested directors, [are] usually referred to as ‘independent directors’ . . . .”);
Kleiman & Teodoro, supra note 26, at 28 (“Registered funds are required to have a board of
directors, a majority of whom must be ‘disinterested’ or ‘independent.’”).
Some states, also conflating the distinction, have enacted laws providing that a person who is
not an “interested person” under the Act shall be presumed to be “independent” under state law.
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.3 (LexisNexis 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 182, § 2B (West Supp. 2007). No doubt, such semantic alchemy increases the number of
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1940 and is evidenced by a statement of the Chief Counsel of the
SEC’s Investment Trust Study:
The bill as originally introduced . . . required that a majority of the board be
independent of the management. However, . . . it was urged that if a person [the
investor] is buying management of a particular person and if the majority of the board
can repudiate his advice, then in effect, you are depriving the stockholders of that
person’s advice . . . . [T]hat is why the provision for 40 percent of independents was
inserted.60

The Supreme Court continued to equate uncritically the
concepts of disinterestedness and independence in 1979 when it
described the central role of disinterested directors under the Act:
“Congress consciously chose to address the conflict-of-interest problem
through the Act’s independent director section, rather than through
more drastic remedies such as complete disaffiliation of the companies
from their advisers or compulsory internalization of the management
function.”61 Even the SEC has adopted this unfortunate convention.62
In response to market timing, late trading, and related
scandals in 2003,63 the SEC sought by rulemaking to bolster the
independence requirement.64 It did not do so by requiring directors to
be more independent, but by requiring that a greater percentage of
directors fall outside the Act’s existing definition of “interested
person.” In 2004, the SEC conditioned certain regulatory exemptions
on what it called the independence of at least seventy-five percent of a
mutual fund’s board and the independence of its chairman.65
“Independent” means, as it always has in this context, not “interested”
under the Act.66 The SEC also required enhanced disclosure to
investors of the material factors and conclusions pertaining to the

“independent” mutual fund directors who can consider, under state law principles, whether to
comply with a mutual fund investor’s demand that a derivative action be commenced. This is an
ironic move because, as seen in Part IV, infra, state corporate law principles increasingly
differentiate between those two notions.
60. Martin E. Lybecker, Enhanced Corporate Governance for Mutual Funds: A Flawed
Concept that Deserves Serious Reconsideration, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1045, 1051 (2005) (citing
statement of David Schenker, Chief Counsel of the SEC’s Investment Trust Study).
61. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 483 (1979).
62. In 2004, the SEC stated: “In this Release we are using ‘independent director’ to refer to
a director who is not an ‘interested person’ of the fund, as defined in the Act.” Investment
Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,381
n.23 (Aug. 2, 2004).
63. See sources cited supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
65. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,381.
66. See id. at 46,381 n.23.
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board’s approval of the most recent advisory contract.67 The SEC
emphasized the importance of an independent mutual fund board,
stating: “[A] fund board must be an independent force in fund affairs
rather than a passive affiliate of management.”68 Although these rule
changes are mired in litigation on procedural grounds,69 many funds
have implemented them voluntarily.70
Structural reform of the sort adopted by the SEC to regulate
the advisory contract through fund directors is useful but inadequate
for several reasons. First, the SEC’s conception of independence is too
narrow because it is equated with a lack of “interestedness” as defined
in the Act. The definition does not exclude, for example, persons with
strong personal or business connections to the adviser’s or
subadviser’s officers, or persons who provide direct or indirect services
to the funds, or even certain adviser or subadviser family members.
Nor does the definition address whether directors function
independently and effectively. Second, neither investors nor the SEC
are able to monitor closely thousands of advisory contracts ex ante;
other safeguards are needed if directors and advisers fail to protect
investor interests. Third, as Professor Langevoort and others have
argued,71 in the mutual fund industry, market discipline may not
work for the good of investors as robustly as analogies to market
forces in corporate governance suggest. Congress recognized this
argument in 1970, stating: “But in the mutual fund industry . . . these
marketplace forces are not likely to operate as effectively.”72 Finally,
in 1970, both the SEC and Congress were uneasy about independent
boards as a sufficient check on excessive fees. As the Supreme Court
noted in 1984, “Congress decided not to rely solely on the fund’s
directors to assure reasonable fees, notwithstanding the increased
disinterestedness of the board.”73 As a regulatory strategy, therefore,
director approval of advisory contracts under section 15(c) must be

67. Disclosure Regarding Approval of Investment Advisory Contracts by Directors of
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,486, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,798 (June
30, 2004).
68. Investment Company Governance, 69 Fed. Reg. at 46,380.
69. See cases cited supra note 5 and accompanying text.
70. Kara Scannell & Tom Lauricella, SEC Considers Fund-Board Compromise, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 15, 2007, at C13 (reporting that eighty percent of mutual funds have boards with seventyfive percent of its members from outside the industry, according to the Investment Company
Institute).
71. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
72. S. REP. NO. 91-184, 5 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4897, 4901; see also
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 534 n.10 (1984).
73. Fox, 464 U.S. at 540; Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S. 471, 481 n.10, 484 (1979).
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supplemented by viable private litigation with respect to excessive
fees.
Congress provided such an express right of action in 1970 by
adding section 36(b). That section took on greater significance when
courts ruled that neither section 15(a)74 nor 15(c)75 supports implied
private rights of action for excessive fees. Moreover, courts also have
begun to abandon the longstanding view that section 36(a) supports a
private right of action.76 Consequently, the one undoubted litigation
vehicle for protecting investors against conflicts of interest surfacing
in the form of excessive advisory fees is section 36(b). Given the
growing uncertainty as to whether other sections of the Act support
private rights of action, one important interpretive issue under section
36(b) is the scope of conduct for which the Act provides redress. This
Article, however, focuses specifically on management fees paid to the
adviser pursuant to the advisory contract, a matter undoubtedly
within the coverage of section 36(b).
Section 36(b) specifies that an investment adviser of a
registered investment company “shall be deemed to have a fiduciary
duty with respect to the receipt of compensation for services.”77 The
section provides that the SEC or a security holder of the company, but
not the company itself, may bring an action on behalf of the company
against the adviser or any affiliated person “for breach of fiduciary
duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such
registered investment company or by the security holders thereof to
such adviser or person.”78 Strictly speaking, the action is not a
“derivative” action because the company itself cannot initiate a
lawsuit.79 This frees an investor from any need to make a demand on
the board of directors before beginning the suit.80 Section 36(b)(1)
mandates that the plaintiff “shall have the burden of proving a breach

74. Tarlov v. Paine Weber Cashfund, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 429 (D. Conn. 1983). Section 15(a),
however, has been interpreted to provide a right of action against an investment adviser accused
of self-dealing. Fogel v. Chestnutt, 668 F.2d 100 (2d Cir. 1981).
75. Halligan v. Standard & Poor’s/Intercapital, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (E.D.N.Y.
1977).
76. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1025 (collecting authority); Palmiter, supra note 14,
at 181 n.73 (same). Palmiter argues that a refusal to imply a private action under section 36(a)
“flies in the face of legislative urgings.” Palmiter, supra note 14, at 181 n.73. See generally
William K. Sjostrom, Tapping the Reservoir: Mutual Fund Litigation Under Section 36(a) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 251 (2006).
77. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36(b), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2000).
78. Id.
79. Id.; Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523 (1984).
80. Fox, 464 U.S. at 527-28.
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of fiduciary duty.”81 Personal misconduct, however, is not an element
of the claim.82 No action may be brought against a person who is not
the recipient of compensation, and any award of damages against such
recipient is limited to actual damages resulting from the breach of
fiduciary duty; punitive damages may not be recovered.83 Damages
cannot be recovered for any period prior to one year before the action
is commenced.84 Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction,85 and there
is no right to a jury trial.86
In sum, as noted by the Supreme Court,87 Congress adopted a
two-fold regulatory approach to adviser conflicts. This strategy relied
in part on “the structural requirement” of disinterested director
negotiation with the investment adviser under section 15, and in part
on meaningful private fiduciary duty litigation initiated by investors
under section 36(b).88 The court described this as a “policy choice” to
provide “independent checks on excessive fees.”89 The dual director
approval and investor litigation approaches to regulation are not as
unrelated as Congress thought in 1970 or as the Supreme Court might
have suggested in Fox. The vital connection between independent
directors and fiduciary duty litigation becomes clear in a profoundly
negative way when reviewing case law under section 36(b) over the
last twenty-five years. A survey reveals that the arrested state of
development of section 36(b) jurisprudence stands in marked contrast
to the ongoing development of fiduciary duty litigation in corporate
law, where the concepts of director independence and fiduciary duty
are linked. Part III traces the short arc of independence in mutual
fund fiduciary duty litigation over the last quarter-century, and Part
IV traces the larger arc in corporate law over the same period.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1).
Id.
Id. § 80a-35(b)(3).
Id.
Id. § 80a-35(b)(5).
Krinsk v. Fund Asset Management, Inc., 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1989).
Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 538-41 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 541.
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III. EMPIRICAL DATA ON MUTUAL FUND FEE LITIGATION SINCE
GARTENBERG
A. Does Independence Matter For Adviser Fees?
The OEA recently reviewed the rather undeveloped finance
literature addressing the relationship between board structure and
fees in the mutual fund industry.90 Some studies find that funds with
smaller boards and a larger percentage of independent directors tend
to negotiate and approve lower fees.91 Also, independent directors are
more likely to authorize share repurchases,92 initiate fund mergers,
and make decisions designed to benefit investors, such as replacing
poorly performing managers.93 This led the OEA to conclude
tentatively that “boards with a greater proportion of independent
directors are more likely to make decisions such as negotiating lower
adviser fees that may potentially lead to higher returns.”94 The study
cautions, however, that due to insufficient data and certain
methodological factors, there is “no consistent evidence that chair or
board independence is associated with lower fees and/or higher
returns for fund shareholders in the cross-section.”95
Yet, a key assumption in the OEA’s mixed findings—like that
of discourse generally in the mutual fund culture96—is that someone
who is not an “interested person” as defined in the Act is an
independent director.97 However, in an unpublished March 2007
study,98 Professor Camelia Kuhnen employed a richer understanding
of independence and examined the effect on investor welfare of past
business dealings between mutual fund directors and advisers (or
subadvisers) in advisory contracts for all U.S. mutual funds during
1993-2002. These kinds of repeated dealings, although not
encompassed in the definition of “interestedness” (and, hence,
90. OEA Study, supra note 31.
91. Peter Tufano & Matthew Sevick, Board Structure and Fee-Setting in the U.S. Mutual
Fund Industry, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 321 (1997); see also Del Guerico et al., supra note 30, at 148.
92. See Del Guerico et al., supra note 30, at 148.
93. OEA Study, supra note 31 at 13.
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id. at 24.
96. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
97. In fact, the OEA used a definition of independence that assumed all “outside” directors
were independent. OEA Study, supra note 31, at 2 n.1. That definition, if in fact used, could
characterize as “independent” certain directors who would be considered “interested persons”
under the Act.
98. Kuhnen, supra note 21.
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“independence”) under the Act, are precisely the sort of interactions
that raise concerns about director independence in corporate law.
Professor Kuhnen found that business connections—
specifically the number of times fund directors have sat on boards of
any other funds managed by the adviser and a related measure of
connectivity between the adviser and a potential new subadviser—
foster favoritism in dealings between fund directors and advisers to
the detriment of investors.99 She found that when mutual funds select
subadvisory firms to help the primary adviser manage the fund, the
greater the connection between such firms and fund directors through
past business relationships, the more likely they are to win the
management contract.100 Moreover, the more connected subadvisers
and fund directors are, the lower the net and risk-adjusted rates of
return.101 Past business connections also play a role in an adviser’s
selection of directors to serve on new funds sponsored by the
adviser.102 In addition, Professor Kuhnen found that business
connections are positive predictors of expense ratios and advisory
fees.103 She also concluded that all measures of business connections
are significant negative predictors of the amount of expenses the
advisor reimburses to the fund.104 For the entire sample, a similar
increase in measures of director to adviser connections corresponded
to a 1.5% increase in the advisory fee, which results in an aggregate
fee increase of $1 billion transferred from funds to advisers each
year.105 The data, Professor Kuhnen cautions, establishes a correlation
and does not test for causality between business connections and
performance.106 The data does tend to rule out information
asymmetries, ease of monitoring, and reduced search costs as
plausible reasons for directors hiring advisers whom they have dealt
with in the past. Overall, the findings strongly suggest that a richer
conception of independence, designed to identify the variety of
relationships between fund directors and persons associated with
advisers and subadvisers, may be useful in identifying funds where
fees warrant special judicial scrutiny under section 36(b).

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 4-6, 24.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 6.
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B. The Gartenberg Decision
How important of a role has director independence (using the
Act’s narrow definition) actually played in section 36(b) fee litigation?
The leading case under section 36(b) is Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch
Asset Management Inc., a 1982 decision of the Second Circuit.107 In
Gartenberg, the plaintiff challenged advisory fees charged by Merrill
Lynch Asset Management, Inc. on a money market fund that in four
years had grown from $428 million to more than $19 billion. Although
the fee as a percentage of net assets declined gradually from 0.5% to
0.275% for assets in excess of $2.5 billion, the plaintiff argued that the
fee as a percentage of assets should be even lower due to significant
economies of scale.108 Six of the eight trustees on the fund board that
had approved the contract were “noninterested” as then defined in the
Act.109
In the district court, Judge Milton Pollack scoured the
legislative history of section 36(b) for guidance in interpreting the
fiduciary duty language in the statute. He observed that Congress
“was not precise in delineating the test for compliance with the
fiduciary standard.”110 The net effect, he concluded, “would seem to
leave it to the federal courts to interpret compliance with ‘fiduciary
duty’ in the common law tradition (. . . really federal equity
jurisprudence).”111 The Second Circuit, after its own review of the
legislative history, likewise concluded that Congress had made “no
attempt to set forth a definitive test by which observance or breach of
fiduciary duty was to be determined.”112 It found that the adoption of
the fiduciary duty standard in section 36(b), instead of the
reasonableness test used in earlier failed bills, was more of a
“semantical than substantive compromise.”113
107. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
108. Id. at 926. See Cox & Payne, supra note 16, at 923-25, for further details of the case.
109. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 926.
110. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1045 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
111. Id. at 1046.
112. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928.
113. Id. As the Supreme Court’s review of legislative history two years after Gartenberg
made clear, the dispute between the SEC and the mutual fund industry in the late 1960s
apparently was not so much a disagreement about the substantive standard proposed in earlier
bills—“reasonableness”—as it was disagreement over who could bring an action. Daily Income
Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 538-40 (1984). The SEC, in an earlier proposal, sought to have
Congress empower it to bring actions enforcing the “reasonableness” standard and to intervene
in any action brought by or on behalf of the company. Id. at 538. The mutual fund industry
expressed concern about the SEC enforcing a provision as, in essence, granting the SEC ratemaking authority. Id. As an alternative, the Investment Company Institute proposed an
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In Gartenberg, the Second Circuit phrased the test under
section 36(b) in two quite different ways. In a famous passage, the
court seemed to adopt a two-prong approach, stating that to violate
section 36(b) an investment adviser must charge a fee that is “so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the
services rendered and could not have been the product of arm’s length
bargaining.”114 In the preceding paragraph, however, the court
described a singular focus and asserted that “the test is essentially
whether the fee schedule represents a charge within the range of what
would have been negotiated at arm’s length in the light of all the
surrounding circumstances.”115 Nothing like the “so disproportionately
large” language appears in this earlier rendition of the test.
Between its two formulations of the test, the court noted the
Senate’s appreciation that the structure of a mutual fund did not lend
itself to the workings of the usual market forces: “The Senate
recognized that as a practical matter the usual arm’s length
bargaining between strangers does not occur between an adviser and
the fund.”116 Thus, the court effectively conceded that the second,
process-oriented half of the two-prong formulation—i.e., arm’s length
bargaining—rarely will exist, which makes it an odd element of the
test. Moreover, the court illogically framed the first prong in a way
that deviates from “reasonableness” and seemed to require
extremeness—“so
disproportionately
large,”
not
just
“disproportionately large,” and “no reasonable relationship,” not just
“unreasonable.”
Moreover, the “so disproportionately large” language seems
better suited to capture one way a fee might constitute a breach of an
adviser’s fiduciary duty, but not the only way. This is seen in a portion
of the legislative history cited by Judge Pollack, but not by the Second
Circuit. Judge Pollack noted:
[Some] members of Congress left open the possibility that in certain limited
circumstances the fee, considered by itself, might be enough to prove a breach of the

alternative to the SEC bill under which only the company or a security holder could bring an
action. Id. The proposed industry alternative, however, retained the “reasonableness” standard.
The provision ultimately enacted by Congress rejected the industry proposal that the company
itself be authorized to bring suit in favor of permitting either the SEC or an investor acting on
behalf of the company to initiate an action. The “fiduciary duty” standard also was substituted
for the earlier “reasonableness” language, but not, apparently, because the industry found the
earlier language objectionable. Id. at 539.
114. 694 F.2d at 928 (emphasis added); see Richard M. Phillips, Mutual Fund Independent
Directors: A Model for Corporate America?, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST. PERSP., Aug. 2003, at 1,
10.
115. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928; see Phillips, supra note 114, at 10.
116. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928.
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section 36(b) standard. Senator Bennett, in his remarks on the bill, stated that the
section authorized lawsuits “in the event that the fee received is claimed to be so
excessive as to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty.”117

By analogy, in corporate fiduciary doctrine, it is accepted that a
court may infer a breach of fiduciary duty from an egregious
substantive outcome. As the Delaware Supreme Court has noted, a
business decision may be substantively “so far beyond the bounds of
reasonable judgment that it seems essentially inexplicable on any
ground other than bad faith.”118 An egregious outcome is thus one way
to demonstrate bad faith; however, it is neither the only way, nor an
exhaustive definition of bad faith.119
The Second Circuit, in an effort to elaborate its test, delineated
several factors related to the manner in which the fund’s directors
conduct the fee negotiations that are “important” to determine
whether the adviser violated its fiduciary duty under section 36(b).120
Notably, however, the court stated that even if the trustees
endeavored to act responsibly, a fee nonetheless could be “so
disproportionately large as to amount to a breach of fiduciary duty in
violation of section 36(b).”121 In other words, the court conceded that
the test is not solely whether the fee is “so disproportionately large,”
but that a disproportionate fee is one way for a court to infer that an
adviser breached its fiduciary duty. Conversely, the court’s language
also clearly indicates that the behavior of the fund’s trustees is a
consideration that bears on the adviser’s compliance with its fiduciary
duty. Thus, if independent fund directors act properly, a
disproportionate fee still may indicate a breach of fiduciary duty. By
the court’s own reasoning, however, if fund directors do not behave
properly, then that improper behavior is an important consideration
as to whether the adviser breached its duty.
Furthermore, given the court’s clear acknowledgement that a
reasonableness
standard
is
appropriate,
its
phrase
“so
disproportionately large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the
services rendered” is either a verbose way to express a reasonableness
requirement or it wrongly introduces a stricter requirement that
contradicts the very reasonableness standard that the court seemingly

117. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1045-46 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (emphasis added).
118. Parnes v. Bally Entm’t Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999).
119. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (noting nonexhaustive examples of conduct that would establish a lack of good faith).
120. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 930.
121. Id.
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endorsed.122 The reading more consistent with legislative history and
the rest of the opinion is that the court spoke clumsily. Certain
important conclusions follow from this analysis. For example, the
waste standard has no application whatsoever, a point that the
Supreme Court underscored two years later.123 Moreover, the
deferential business judgment standard of review has no place under a
“reasonableness” standard, as corporate fiduciary duty jurisprudence
makes clear,124 particularly when the genuine independence of fund
directors is not established. Finally, the Gartenberg court ultimately
concluded that the fees in that case were not unfair and evaluated the
adviser’s conduct pursuant to the fairness test applied by Judge
Pollack125 and referred to several times by the court.126 Thus, fairness
is the applicable standard for judicially reviewing advisory fees. It is a
strikingly odd feature of the Gartenberg case that Judge Pollack and
the Second Circuit initially questioned a “reasonableness” standard,127
but then acknowledged that section 36(b) triggered judicial review of
adviser conduct by “rigorous scrutiny,” which required “utmost
fairness.”128 In corporate fiduciary duty law, it is well known that the
fairness standard of review requires “even more exacting scrutiny”
than judicial review for reasonableness.129 Under a fairness standard
of review, courts closely scrutinize both the conduct of a self-dealing
fiduciary and the substance of the deal struck.130 Thus, by substituting

122. See Phillips, supra note 114, at 9 (“[T]he directors . . . [have] the duty to satisfy
themselves on an annual basis that the investment adviser satisfied its fiduciary duty to have a
reasonable fee.”).
123. Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 534 n.10 (1984) (“The new right created
by § 36(b) is not only formally distinct from that asserted in a state claim of corporate waste; it is
substantively different as well. Indeed, an important reason for the enactment of § 36(b) was
Congress’s belief that the standards applied in corporate waste actions were inadequate to
ensure reasonable adviser fees.”). Thus, Judge Pollack is simply wrong to assert that Congress
“did not indicate that the common law standard of ‘corporate waste,’ which had previously been
available to challenge advisory fees, was to be disregarded as an element of the Court’s inquiry.”
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
124. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994)
(noting situations mandating that a court take a more direct and active role in overseeing
decisions of directors and subjecting directors’ conduct “to enhanced scrutiny to ensure that it is
reasonable”).
125. 528 F. Supp. at 1045, 1047, 1049, 1055.
126. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 926-27, 930.
127. Id. at 926-27; 528 F. Supp. at 1045.
128. See Gartenberg, 528 F. Supp. at 1045, 1047, 1049, 1055.
129. QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 42 n.9. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 42, at 204-05,
puzzlingly finds “fairness” a more congenial standard for section 36(b) than a “reasonableness”
standard, but they do not note the stricter scrutiny brought to bear by a court under the former
standard.
130. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
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a fiduciary duty standard for the earlier proposed reasonableness
standard, Congress did not shift the analytical focus away from the
substance (amount) of the management fee but heightened the judicial
standard for reviewing the totality of adviser conduct.
The Gartenberg court articulated several considerations that
bear on the section 36(b) fiduciary duty analysis, and later decisions
distilled these into six factors called the “Gartenberg factors.”131 These
factors are: (1) the nature and quality of services provided to fund
shareholders, (2) the profitability of the fund to the adviser-manager,
(3) fall-out benefits, (4) economies of scale, (5) comparative fee
structure, and (6) the independence and conscientiousness of the
trustees. After considering these factors, the Gartenberg court
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.132
C. The Aftermath of Gartenberg
The most remarkable statistic under section 36(b) is that,
thirty-seven years after its enactment and twenty-five years after
Gartenberg, no investor has obtained a verdict against an investment
adviser.133 Either no adviser has breached its fiduciary duty by
charging an excessive fee or something is amiss under section 36(b).
Another telling statistic is that advisory fees do not change
significantly over time, and advisers rarely are fired.134 As observers
revisit the Act in the wake of several recent mutual fund scandals,135
scholars are criticizing Gartenberg and its progeny severely and
justifiably.136 Scholars raise the question whether, in light of no
investor victories, section 36(b) is working as intended—i.e., as an
“independent check” on excessive fees.137
In the aftermath of Gartenberg, however, two additional
statistics have not been highlighted.138 The first is that of 150
decisions citing Gartenberg, only thirty mention its independence
131. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
132. 694 F.2d at 934.
133. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
134. See Camelia M. Kuhnen, Dynamic Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry 15-16 (Feb.
15, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Vanderbilt Law Review), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=687530 (noting that only about ten percent of all mutual funds
renegotiate the management fee or change the subadviser in any given year, and that there are
only a handful of cases where a primary adviser was fired).
135. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
136. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1023-24; Palmiter, supra note 14, at 179-82.
137. See Daily Income Fund, Inc., v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 541 (1984) (noting actions under
section 36(b) intended by Congress to serve as “independent checks” on excessive fees).
138. For an analysis of these two statistics, see infra Appendix A, pp. 537-42.
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factor.139 Of those thirty cases, sixteen involved motions to dismiss
that were granted, six involved motions to dismiss that were granted
in part and denied in part, one involved a motion to dismiss that was
denied, three involved motions for summary judgment that were
granted, one was a decision on the merits for the defendant, one
granted a motion to reconsider, and three involved motions to dismiss
that were affirmed on appeal.140 All thirty cases that mention the
independence factor also include the troubling “substantially
disproportionate” language analyzed supra,141 and forty-nine
additional cases mentioned that language without discussing
independence.142 The independence factor, which has been contested
so hotly in the SEC’s rulemaking efforts,143 does not play an important
role in very many section 36(b) cases and does not help investors in
these cases. Moreover, the concept has not evolved over the decades
and is equated, too simplistically, with a lack of “interest” as defined
under the Act.
The second statistic relates to a breakdown of post-Gartenberg
cases by circuit. Many of the section 36(b) cases are from the Second
Circuit, where Gartenberg was decided.144 The Sixth and Eleventh
Circuits have no reported decisions under section 36(b), and the D.C.
Circuit has only one.145 The Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits are
the only other circuits that have adopted Gartenberg,146 although
decisions in the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
clearly refer to the decision.147
These statistics suggest that some circuits might be open to an
alternative approach for interpreting section 36(b). Even as to those
circuits that have adopted, or at least refer to, Gartenberg, renewed
attention to the crucial but neglected concept of independence offers a
promising method for injecting greater investor protection into the
139. See infra Appendix A, pp. 537-38. This suggests that the assertion by Coates &
Hubbard, supra note 42, at 210, that “[in] most subsequent opinions, the courts appropriately
spend a substantial amount of time evaluating the credibility, credentials, and reasonableness of
fund directors in their evaluation of fees,” is not, with respect to the Gartenberg independence
factor, supported by the evidence. Moreover, Coates and Hubbard predominantly use the term
“disinterested” director without addressing how a different conception of “independence” under
section 36(b) might alter judicial review. Id.
140. See infra Appendix A, pp. 537-38.
141. See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text; infra Appendix A, pp. 537-38.
142. See infra Appendix A, pp. 539-41.
143. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
144. See infra Appendix A, pp. 537-41.
145. See infra Appendix A, p. 541.
146. See infra Appendix A, p. 541.
147. See infra Appendix A, pp. 541-42.

JOHNSON_PAGE

2008]

3/25/2008 9:40:58 AM

GARTENBERG AT TWENTY-FIVE

521

fiduciary duty standard adopted in section 36(b). Examining the
trajectory traced by independence in corporate law over the twentyfive years since Gartenberg reveals why focusing on the concept of
independence can increase protection for mutual fund investors.
IV. THE RISE OF INDEPENDENCE IN CORPORATE LAW SINCE
GARTENBERG
If both the contours and the role of independence have
languished in mutual fund fee litigation in the last twenty-five years,
they have flourished in corporate fiduciary litigation. Professor Jeffrey
Gordon has compiled empirical data showing a steady increase in the
representation of independent directors on corporate boards from
approximately twenty percent in 1950 to approximately seventy-five
percent in 2005.148 Bearing in mind that there are different definitions
of “independence”—a central point of this Article—the trend is
impressive.
Understandings of independence in corporate law have been
enriched from several sources and have broadened considerably over
the last twenty-five years. The New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”),149
Nasdaq,150 state fiduciary duty law,151 and prestigious bodies such as
the American Law Institute and the American Bar Association
Committee on Corporate Law have contributed valuable perspectives
on the importance and meaning of “independence” in corporate law.152
Since the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, Congress and
the SEC have spoken more fully to the independence issue.153 Some
148. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1565 tbl.1. A recent survey by Shearman & Sterling found
that, among the hundred largest public companies, independent directors continue to comprise
seventy-five percent or more of the boards for the majority of them. TheCorporateCounsel.net
Blog, http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/archive/001321.html (Mar. 1, 2007, 5:46 EST) (on
file with Vanderbilt Law Review) (summarizing Shearman & Sterling’s 4th Annual Corporate
Governance Survey). The role of independent directors in corporate governance has been
extensively addressed. See Sale, supra note 19, at 1381 n.32 (collecting commentary).
149. The independence requirements for directors of companies listed on the New York Stock
Exchange are described in Lyman Johnson & Mark Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1159-68 (2004). For an argument that the SarbanesOxley Act and NYSE standards may lead “independent” directors to become “public” directors
whose chief function is risk management, see Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1817 (2007).
150. Johnson & Sides, supra note 149, at 1168-75 (describing Nasdaq independence
requirements).
151. See infra notes 157-185 and accompanying text.
152. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1481 nn.46-47, 1490 n.93.
153. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 149, at 1159-74; see also Executive Compensation and
Related Person Disclosure, Securities Act Release. No. 8732A, Exchange Act Release No.
54,302A, Investment Company Act Release No. 27,444A, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158, 53,254-59 (Sept. 8,
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sources, notably the NYSE and Nasdaq, adopted a rules-based
approach to the concept of independence after the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, just as section 2(a)(19) of the Act has done for
mutual funds. The NYSE prudently has cautioned, however, that it is
“not possible to anticipate, or explicitly to provide for, all
circumstances that might signal potential conflicts of interest, or that
might bear on the materiality of a director’s relationship to a listed
company.”154 The NYSE also rightly resisted taking the position “as a
categorical matter that any director who passes the bright line tests
[under the listing standards] is per se independent.”155
The influential Delaware courts have taken a more opentextured standards approach to independence in preference to a
specific rules approach.156 These courts, which are called on repeatedly
to delineate the equitable limitations on the exercise of legal powers
by those owing fiduciary duties, such as directors and controlling
shareholders, have deployed independence as a core component of
fiduciary duty analysis over the last three decades. Proceeding by the
common law method of adjudication, the Delaware courts have shaped
the notion of independence in a way that is more subtle and efficient
than what legislation or administrative agency rules alone can do.
An initial endorsement of independence from the Delaware
Chancery Court appears as early as 1971 in Puma v. Marriott.157
Independence in corporate law had not yet been separated fully from
the related concept of the outside director, and, therefore, the Court
spoke of “outside, independent directors whose sole interest was the
furtherance of the corporate enterprise.”158 In 1984, the Delaware
Supreme Court elaborated a broad, philosophical definition of
“independence” that, in substance, harkened (without citation) back to

2006) (adopting new item 407 of Reg. S-K and Reg. S-B requiring narrative explanation of
independence status of directors under a company’s director independence policies).
154. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A02 cmt. (2004).
155. See NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303A, Corporate Governance Listing
Standards, Frequently Asked Questions 8 (last updated Feb. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/section303Afaqs.pdf.
156. See infra notes 157-185 and accompanying text. For another well-developed assessment
of how Delaware’s approach to the independence issue differs from that taken by the SarbanesOxley Act, the NYSE, and Nasdaq, see Usha Rodriguez, The Fetishization of Independence (Univ.
of Ga. Sch. of Law Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-007, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=968513.
157. 283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971).
158. Id. at 696. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 1478 for a discussion of the era of the “outside”
director, a concept that preceded the notions of “disinterested” and “independent” in corporate
discourse.
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Puma’s more cryptic statement.159 In Aronson v. Lewis, the Supreme
Court stated:
Independence means that a director’s decision is based on the corporate merits of the
subject before the board rather than extraneous considerations or influences . . . . It is
the care, attention and sense of individual responsibility to the performance of one’s
duties . . . that generally touches on independence.160

Vice Chancellor Leo Strine later summarized the independence
inquiry as asking, broadly, whether “a director is, for any substantial
reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best interests of
the corporation in mind.”161
Many observers question whether genuine independence of the
sort so loftily described above has been attained, or is attainable, in
corporate law.162 Other commentators have not faulted so much the
seemingly broad conceptual definition of “independence,” as they have
criticized how Delaware courts have resolved the independence issue
in particular factual settings, especially as courts sometimes may
underemphasize personal and social connections among directors.163
The point here is not to contend that Delaware courts always have
handled the concept of director independence properly in fiduciary
analyses, but rather to explore the broader meaning and reach of the
concept as contrasted to mutual fund fee litigation under section 36(b)
of the Act.
At a doctrinal level, the conceptual breadth of independence
articulated in Aronson repeatedly has been reaffirmed.164 Moreover,
the centrality of the concept in fiduciary duty analysis has been
underscored, thereby enabling the concept to grow in several ways.
First, in several contexts, the independence of directors is now a
pivotal inquiry that goes beyond examining the mere structural or
putative composition of the board.165 It is significant in director
conflict-of-interest transactions,166 in reviewing defensive measures
159. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
160. Id. at 816.
161. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003).
162. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 19.
163. See Brown, supra note 18, at 70; Gelb, supra note 18, at 135; Rachel Fink, Note, Social
Ties in the Boardroom: Changing the Definition of Director Independence to Eliminate “Rubber
Stamping” Boards, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 455 (2006).
164. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); Rales v. Blasband,
634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993); In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004
WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 2002).
165. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of La. v. Aidinoff, 900 A.2d 654, 669 nn.19-20 (Del. Ch.
2006).
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relating to hostile takeovers,167 in determining whether demand on
the board is excused in derivative litigation,168 in reviewing the
conduct of special litigation committees in demand-excused derivative
litigation,169 and in reviewing the performance of special negotiating
committees dealing with controlling shareholders on major
transactions.170 Second, the Delaware Supreme Court, invoking
Aronson’s broad language on independence,171 has emphasized that
the independence inquiry is not limited to an examination of
interrelationships between board or committee members and a
corporate actor owing a fiduciary duty, but also entails examining
whether such members actually “functioned independently.”172 In
other words, independence has both a structural and a process
dimension, the latter often being overlooked.
Finally, the broad philosophical framing of independence found
in Puma and Aronson enabled the concept to break free of the
narrower notion of interestedness with which it often was (and still is)
confused. In 2002, Chancellor William Chandler wrote that although
“interest and independence are two separate and distinct issues, these
two attributes are sometimes confused by parties.”173 Vice Chancellor
Strine, lauding Chandler’s analysis of independence as “searching and
sophisticated,”174 summed up the difference between the two
attributes this way:
A director is interested if he receives something from the transaction that is different
than that received by the corporation or its other stockholders. A director is not
independent if his relationship to a director interested in the decision at hand makes
him unable to fulfill his duties to the corporation impartially.175

167. See, e.g., Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
168. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Rales, 634 A. 2d 927; In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol.
S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007).
169. See, e.g., Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative
Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
170. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997); Gesoff v. IIC Indus., 902 A.2d 1130
(Del. Ch. 2006).
171. See supra note 160.
172. Kahn, 694 A.2d at 429-30; see also In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No.
Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at *33 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
173. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002). The Chancellor then goes on at
length to describe the differences. Id.; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 official cmt. (1984)
(noting that the Model Business Corporation Act does not attempt to define independent
director, unlike stock exchange listing standards, and stating that “disinterestedness” is not
identical to “independence”).
174. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1380 n.32 (2002).
175. Id. at 1377 n.16.
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Strine also observed that whether a director can “act
independently” is “inherently situational.”176 This captures the factsensitive, context-laden approach to the subject of independence as an
equitable standard rather than a bright-line, legal rule. The state law
approach does not displace and it is not displaced by Sarbanes-Oxley
or applicable to NYSE or Nasdaq listing standards.177 Rather, each
supplements the other by taking different regulatory approaches.
A director may lack independence on a matter, in the sense
described by Chancellor Chandler, if he is “beholden” to another
officer, director, or controlling shareholder proposing a transaction
with the corporation.178 Such a state exists if the other party has the
direct or indirect power to
decide whether the challenged director continues to receive
otherwise, upon which the challenged director is so dependent
material importance to him that the threatened loss of that
reason to question whether the controlled director is able to
merits of the challenged transaction objectively.179

a benefit, financial or
or is of such subjective
benefit might create a
consider the corporate

The reason for concern in these settings was noted cogently by
French philosopher René Descartes: “A man is incapable of
comprehending any argument that interferes with his revenue.”180
Alternatively, a director may lack independence because of a “close
personal or familial relationship or through force of will.”181
Notably, the focus is not simply whether a director whose
independence is at issue has a relationship to the company, as is the
case under Sarbanes-Oxley and NYSE and Nasdaq listing
standards,182 but whether that director has a connection to the
particular fiduciary (director, officer, controlling shareholder) who is
dealing with the company on a transaction.183 The Delaware “duty”
approach of examining relationships with particular persons as the
crux of the independence inquiry reinforces the underlying thrust of
the “rules” approach because there, too, the ultimate “concern is
independence from management.”184 Under Delaware’s approach,
there are numerous cases in which, at particular procedural stages of

176. Id.; see also Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004) (“Independence is a factspecific determination made in the context of a particular case.”).
177. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 149.
178. Orman, 794 A.2d at 25 n.50.
179. Id.; see also In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007).
180. DANIEL YANKELOVICH, PROFIT WITH HONOR 140 (2006) (quoting Descartes).
181. Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, 802 A.2d 257, 264 (Del. 2002); Orman, 794 A.2d at 25 n.50.
182. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 149, at 1213.
183. See Rodriguez, supra note 156, at 53.
184. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.02 cmt. (2004).
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litigation, the independence of one or more directors was found lacking
or questionable.185
Many of these instances involved directors who, in the mutual
fund context, would not be considered “interested” under the Act.186
For example, a mutual fund director who is a brother-in-law, son-inlaw, or grandson of the investment adviser’s CEO is not interested
statutorily but should not be considered independent either.187
Likewise, a fund director who has significant, non-fund-related
financial dealings with such a CEO or any other senior officer of, or
principal in, the investment adviser should not be considered
independent. A director who is, or has a family member who is, a
partner, co-investor, or party otherwise financially involved with an
officer or principal of the adviser may not be independent. Concern for
their own or their family’s well-being may prevent the director from
placing the company’s interests first.188 Such close personal, financial,
and, in some settings, social connections189 raise substantial doubts

185. See, e.g., Telxon, 802 A.2d 257; In re InfoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 1956-CC,
2007 WL 2419611, at *16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 13, 2007); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig.,
919 A.2d 563 (Del. Ch. 2007); Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 356, 361 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re
Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745 (Del. Ch. May 3,
2004); see also Brown, supra note 18, at 72 nn.93-94, 73 nn.98-101 (collecting additional
authority); Strine, supra note 174 (collecting authority).
186. Cf. Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence
and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 266 (2002) (noting the possibility that
“some directors who are classified as independent are not truly independent of management
because they are beholden to the company or its current CEO in ways too subtle to be captured
in customary definitions of independence”).
187. See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc., 2004 WL 1305745, at *34 (citing family
relationships found to raise a concern about director independence); Strine, supra note 174
(same).
188. Section 2(a)(19)(B)(vii) of the Investment Company Act includes within the definition of
“interested person”:
[Any] natural person whom the Commission by order shall have determined to be an
interested person by reason of having had at any time since the beginning of the last
two completed fiscal years of such investment company a material business or
professional relationship with such investment adviser or . . . with the principal
executive officer or any controlling person of such investment adviser.
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a)(19)(B)(vii), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vii) (2000). The
provision, by its terms, requires an SEC order before such a person is considered “interested.”
Such a determination is not retroactive. See Barnett, supra note 14, at 166-68. Thus, close
connections between senior officers of an adviser and fund directors are unlikely to make such
directors “interested” for purposes of section 36(b) litigation. Under Delaware law, by way of
contrast, concerns about independence would arise in that situation.
189. In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding members
of special litigation committee not independent); see also Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 105052, 1054-56 (Del. 2004) (noting that some social connections can raise serious concern as to
director independence and contrasting independence inquiries in pre-suit demand and demandexcused contexts).
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about director independence. But, with respect to a mutual fund
company, such persons are not considered “interested” under the Act
and, therefore, automatically are considered “independent.” Finally, a
director who has other directorships with funds managed (or submanaged) by the adviser (or subadviser) may not be a trustworthy
person to act only in the interests of the fund and its investors.190
The aim here is not to recount exhaustively the myriad ways in
which a director may lack independence. Rather, by looking to
corporate law for guidance, we see that in the mutual fund arena it is
wrong and simplistic to equate the independence factor under the
Gartenberg analysis with the Act’s narrow statutory definition of
“interestedness.” How might mutual fund fee litigation under section
36(b) draw on corporate law’s more sophisticated understanding of
“independence” to increase investor protection?
V. A PROPOSAL FOR BORROWING “INDEPENDENCE” FROM CORPORATE
LAW TO IMPROVE MUTUAL FUND FEE LITIGATION
One response to the stunning lack of investor success under
Gartenberg and its progeny would be for Congress to amend section
36(b) to better advance investor welfare. This might be done by
expanding the category of “interested persons” under section 2(a)(19),
perhaps by removing from subsection (vii) the requirement of a prior
Commission order.191 Another possibility is to specify more fully and
precisely the duties of fund directors.192 Perhaps, too, some modest
exposure to liability on the part of fund directors themselves, of the
kind suggested in the American Law Institute’s Principles of
Corporate Governance,193 might lead to greater vigilance in
negotiating the advisory contract. Another response would be to
rethink the existing “fiduciary duty” standard in a way that provides
more meaningful protection for investors. This Article favors the last
approach.
In two respects, the independence factor from Gartenberg
should play a more prominent role in mutual fund fee litigation under
section 36(b). First, as has occurred in corporate law discourse over
190. See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 188 (noting the necessity of an SEC order determining that certain
persons come within the statutory definition of “interested person”).
192. See Hurst, supra note 28, at 152-53 (calling for statutory strengthening of fiduciary
duties).
193. 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.19
(1994) (permitting stockholders to limit director or officer liability, but only to the amount of
annual compensation).
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the past twenty-five years, the concept of independence must be more
sharply distinguished from the related, but distinct and narrower,
notion of interestedness. Although the term “independence” entered
the vocabulary earlier in the mutual fund industry,194 it continues to
be a shrunken conception that is equated simplistically with a lack of
“interestedness.”195 It is perhaps more, not less, important to have a
robust conception of independence in the mutual fund industry given
that investors in funds have, overall, less influence over fund affairs
than shareholders have over corporate affairs. Second, the concept of
independence must assume greater procedural significance in section
36(b) litigation.
The enactment of section 36(b) reveals a policy decision to
transform the very nature of the investment advisory agreement from
a mere contractual interaction between the adviser and the fund into
a fiduciary relationship. By deeming the adviser to owe a fiduciary
duty, the statute effectively considers the advisory contract to
represent self-dealing by the adviser in relationship to the fund. A
core requirement of fiduciary duty is an obligation of loyalty
prohibiting self-dealing by a fiduciary except under strict conditions.196
Moreover, the adviser might be characterized as an agent of the
mutual fund, thereby owing the array of duties, including loyalty,
owed by an agent to its principal. This applies to subadvisers and
portfolio managers as well; as subagents they, too, owe an ultimate
duty of loyalty to fund investors.197 Traditionally, as the Second
Circuit recognizes,198 a fiduciary who deals with a company to whom a
duty is owed must carry the burden of proving that the transaction is
in the best interests of the company and is fair.199 Moreover, judicial
review of such matters is close and searching, not deferential.200
Courts review both process and substance in making this overall

194. See supra text accompanying note 60 (considering the requirement that forty percent of
the board of a mutual fund be independent); cases cited supra notes 157-161 and accompanying
text (describing an “independent” director as one who carries out his duties solely in the interest
of the corporate enterprise without any extraneous considerations or influences).
195. See supra notes 59, 61-62 and accompanying text (explaining that both the Supreme
Court and the SEC have equated the ideas of independence and disinterestedness).
196. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986)
(reiterating that a corporate director owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the corporation);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006) (explaining that an agent owes a fiduciary duty
of loyalty to the principal).
197. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15(i) & cmt. d (defining subagent and
imposing upon subagents a duty of loyalty to the principal).
198. Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 768 (2d Cir. 1980).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 769; Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
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“fairness” determination.201 If disinterested, independent directors
carefully approve a self-dealing transaction with a director, for
example, courts will accord greater deference to that decision because
they have greater assurance that a “neutral decisionmaker”
appropriately has approved the matter.202
Where a special negotiating committee of disinterested,
independent directors approves a self-dealing transaction with a
controlling shareholder, however, the directors also must function
independently; they must bargain freely at arm’s length and make a
well-advised decision not dictated by the shareholder.203 Even if those
exacting requirements are met, the court will still review closely the
matter under a fairness standard but will place the burden of proof on
the plaintiff.204 The reason for retaining the demanding fairness
standard (which requires not simply the best price, but also a “fair
price”) is to address a basic policy concern that arises when a
controlling shareholder engages in self-dealing. Due to shareholder
control, directors or minority investors might perceive that their
disapproval will lead to retaliation by the controlling shareholder;
such a perception never can be eliminated fully and may taint the
approval process.205 Therefore, the court, despite various procedural
precautions, substantively reviews transactions with a controlling
shareholder under a more stringent fairness standard.206
Except for the explicit requirement of section 36(b) that the
plaintiff rather than the defendant shall carry the burden of proof, all
other typical fiduciary safeguards should be construed as falling
within the statutory “fiduciary duty” standard. Fiduciary standards in
business governance, being equitable in nature as Judge Pollack
recognized in Gartenberg,207 are not abstract and fixed principles, but
rather exist in particular historical and institutional settings and
must continually be informed by “evolving standards” of expected
conduct.208 This means that the enhancements in fiduciary duty
201. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
202. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1170 & n.25 (Del. 1995).
203. See cases cited supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the Delaware
Supreme Court’s emphasis on the functional independence of directors).
204. Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. 1994); In re Cysire, Inc.
S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 548 (Del. Ch. 2003).
205. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116; In re Cysive, Inc., 836 A.2d at 548.
206. Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1116; In re Cysive, Inc., 836 A.2d at 548.
207. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Milton Pollack’s
description of the proper interpretation of the statutory fiduciary duty language).
208. It is worth recalling a comment about the duty of care made by the ALI PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: “[T]he ‘duty’ . . . component[] of duty of care provisions [is] . . . flexible
and dynamic . . . . [O]bligations may change over time to reflect new conditions or revised
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protections for investors that have been developed in corporate law
over the last twenty-five years should be transplanted into section
36(b) litigation as a matter of federal law. One of these developments
is the more far-reaching and fluid definition of “independence” used in
corporate law.
The Gartenberg independence factor, cited just thirty times in
the last twenty-five years,209 must become far more prominent in
mutual fund fee litigation. The beginning point is to appreciate that,
under the equitable fiduciary duty standard of section 36(b), the
independence requirement goes well beyond the Act’s statutory
requirement that fund directors approving the advisory contract under
section 15(c) not be “interested.” In effect, the nature of fiduciary
discourse in the mutual fund industry needs to mature and “catch up”
with the parallel discourse in corporate law. The SEC came close to
recognizing this but still missed the mark when it stated that “[w]e
recognize that ‘legal’ lack of interestedness does not equate with ‘real’
independence.”210 That is a true observation, but it lacks legal “bite.”
What the SEC should have said is that “legal” lack of interestedness
under section 2(a)(19) and section 15(c) of the Act does not equate
automatically to genuine independence under section 36(b)’s statutory
requirement that an equitable fiduciary duty standard of
independence be met. Correctly understanding the relationship
between “interestedness” and “independence” permits the fiduciary
duty standard of section 36(b) to be interpreted as legally requiring
“real” independence.
Beyond the need for a broader conception of independence—
with respect to both the structure and actual functioning of the
mutual fund board—section 36(b)(2) offers a way to alter the
procedural obligations of each party on the independence issue.
Section 36(b)(2) provides, in essence, that approval of the advisory
contract by the mutual fund board “shall be given such consideration
business practices or mores. Duty of care provisions should be interpreted in light of
contemporary conditions.” 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) cmt. b (1994); see also Paul H. Dawes, Caremark and the Duty of
Care, in SECURITIES LITIGATION 2000, at 219, 225 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook
Series No. B-1199, 2000) (“That directors owe their organizations a duty of care is a venerated
standard of business law, widely if not universally accepted by the legal and financial
community. The understanding of what that duty entails, however, has changed significantly
over time.” (emphasis added)). The same sensitivity to change applies with respect to the duty of
loyalty and to our understanding of independence.
209. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (arguing that the evidence does not support
the assertion that “the courts appropriately spend a substantial amount of time evaluating the
credibility, credentials, and reasonableness of fund directors in their evaluation of fees”).
210. Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520, 69
Fed. Reg. 46,380 (July 27, 2004).

JOHNSON_PAGE

2008]

3/25/2008 9:40:58 AM

GARTENBERG AT TWENTY-FIVE

531

by the court as is deemed appropriate under all the circumstances.”211
We know from corporate fiduciary law that courts treat fully informed
decisions by independent directors differently than those made by
non-independent directors.212 Given the longstanding and quite
significant concerns about whether fund boards continue to be
dominated by investment advisers,213 there is no reason to presume
that an independent fund board approved the advisory contract;
corporate law does not make that presumption with respect to
controlling shareholders. If advisers want significance attached to
director approval, they should establish the independence (broadly
understood) of a majority of the directors on the fund board.214 This
goes not only to structural independence; just as Delaware courts ask
whether directors were fully informed and “functioned” independently,
courts under section 36(b) must ask whether fund directors acted with
“care and conscientiousness” in how they were informed and actually
functioned. Then, if such independence is established, “appropriate”
consideration should lead a court to substitute a somewhat more
deferential “reasonableness” standard for the more searching
“fairness” standard.215 If, however, the adviser does not establish the
independence of a majority of the fund board’s directors, then the
“consideration” that is “appropriate” with respect to approval of the
advisory contract is markedly heightened judicial skepticism, along
with continued application of the exacting fairness standard.216
211. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(2)
(2000).
212. See supra notes 164-169 and accompanying text (listing several contexts in which courts
consider the independence of directors).
213. See Birdthistle, supra note 24, at 1442 (asserting that the market for investment
advisers is not fluid).
214. There are two settings in corporate law where the defendant bears the burden of
establishing independence. The first is in the demand-excused derivative litigation setting where
the special litigation committee bears the burden of proving its independence. In re Oracle Corp.
Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 937 (Del. Ch. 2003). The second setting involves transactions
between the company and controlling shareholders. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 429
(Del. 1997).
215. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (noting that the fairness standard requires
“even more exacting scrutiny” than the reasonableness standard).
216. Vice Chancellor Stephen Lamb recently described how economic fairness will have a
narrower range when a fiduciary self-deals with non-independent persons by means of a faulty
process:
[W]here the pricing terms of a transaction that is the product of an unfair process
cannot be justified by reference to reliable markets or by comparison to substantial
and dependable precedent transactions, the burden of persuading the court of the
fairness of the terms will be exceptionally difficult. Relatedly, where an entire fairness
review is required in such a case of pricing terms that, if negotiated and approved at
arm’s-length, would involve a broad exercise of discretion or judgment by the
directors, common sense suggests that proof of fair price will generally require a
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This approach gives the oft-overlooked section 36(b)(2) a
dignity equal to the more commonly cited section 36(b)(1), which
places the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty on the
plaintiff.217 Under the approach outlined above, the plaintiff retains
the ultimate burden of proof throughout. The adviser, however, has a
choice. If the adviser elects not to establish the independence of fund
directors, or seeks to do so but fails, then section 36(b)(2) mandates
that no (or even negative) consideration or weight be given to director
approvals, and the plaintiff then must address the other Gartenberg
factors with the court reviewing for fairness. If the adviser elects to
establish, and succeeds in establishing, the independence of fund
directors, the plaintiff must address the other Gartenberg factors with
the court reviewing the advisory contract under a lesser standard of
reasonableness. Alternatively, a court might rule that a plaintiff
proves a breach of fiduciary duty by showing that the defendantadviser obtained the contract without the approval of truly
independent directors. Notwithstanding the breach, the defendant
could be given the opportunity to avoid liability by establishing the
fairness of the contract. This system mirrors the practice in corporate
law, where a proven breach of the duty of care by the plaintiff does not
lead to liability per se, but shifts the burden of proving fairness to the
defendant.218 Under either approach, a court should be exceedingly
reluctant to dismiss, before trial, an action involving an advisory
contract where the genuine independence of the fund board has not
been established clearly.219
This approach to reviewing the advisory contract corresponds
to the approach corporate law takes in reviewing significant
transactions between controlling shareholders and the companies that
they control. Delaware courts have described these matters as
“inherently coercive,”220 the precise structural concern that both
Congress and the courts have identified in the mutual fund advisory

showing that the terms of the transaction fit comfortably within the narrow range of
that discretion, not at its outer boundaries.
Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 748-49 (Del. Ch. 2007).
217. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(1)
(2000).
218. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995).
219. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1223-24 (Del. 1999) (noting that close
judicial scrutiny under the demanding Lynch doctrine often precludes dismissal); Kahn, 694 A.2d
at 428 (same).
220. In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ.A. 16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at
*32 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004).
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relationship.221 It also parallels the approach taken by Delaware
courts in derivative litigation where demand has been excused as
futile but a special litigation committee thereafter seeks dismissal.
The committee’s independence in that setting is not presumed; it must
be established.222 The concerns that underlie section 36(b)—indeed,
the concerns pervading the entire Act—similarly warrant special
judicial vigilance on the independence issue.
The remedy under section 36(b) is restitutionary in nature,
although in principle a breach of fiduciary duty need not be so
limited.223 The remedy is that the adviser returns that portion of the
fee that is excessive.224 Such a sanction may not prevent adviser
overreaching because the only penalty for a successful investor
lawsuit is the restoration of ill-gotten gain, which may not prove to be
a behavioral deterrent. At the same time, such a remedy forecloses
those policy concerns that sometimes are raised about damage awards
against corporate directors deterring service by qualified persons or
inducing suboptimal risk-averse behavior.225 A credible monetary
sanction clearly reinforces the statutory requirement that
“noninterested” directors must be the key decisionmakers for mutual
fund matters, including the advisory contract.
In this way, mutual fund fee litigation complements the policy
aims sought by the stalled SEC rules on director independence.226 Risk
of liability under section 36(b)—even if that risk is only marginally
heightened and only occasionally realized because some directors no
longer are considered “independent” under the broader reach of that
term advocated here—likely will induce advisers to ensure more
zealously that directors who approve the advisory contract truly are
both disinterested and independent. This is especially true if an
adviser suffering an adverse verdict under section 36(b) were required
to disclose that fact prominently in communications to investors for,
say, the next year or so. That rule introduces reputational
considerations into adviser conduct. Greater risk of an adverse
outcome for the adviser should serve investor interests better by
221. See supra notes 33, 37 and accompanying text (noting the dominant and controlling
position of most investment advisers and the potential for conflicts between investor and adviser
interests).
222. See supra note 214.
223. See Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049, 1056-61 (2007)
(describing various remedies for an agent’s breach of duty).
224. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 § 36(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b)(3)
(2000).
225. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS.
LAW. 439, 455-56 (2005) (discussing concerns).
226. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
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eventually inculcating a stronger norm of fiduciary obligation on both
the advisers’ and fund directors’ parts. To alter institutional norms in
the mutual fund industry may require an occasional legal “nudge”
from the judiciary—i.e., an investor victory. Healthy norms often are
undergirded and nourished by sound regulation;227 at least the two
cannot be at odds, as they seem to be today. A heightened norm and
culture of loyalty to investor interests may lead to real bargaining for
lower fees of the kind at least modestly seen, for example, with the
AIM Funds.228 Some greater evidence of genuine bargaining over
advisory fees may instill greater public confidence and, at some point,
lead to another twenty-five years with no investor victories under
section 36(b), but for the quite different reason that such wins finally
are not needed anymore.
CONCLUSION
Fiduciary duty discourse has traced a “path dependent” course
in the cabined world of mutual fund fee litigation. As a result, the
“fiduciary duty” regulatory approach to advisory fees adopted in
section 36(b) has failed to provide meaningful investor protection. One
reason is that courts continue to be guided by Gartenberg, a 1982 case
that articulated a faulty test for assessing fiduciary conduct and
spelled out six factors, one of which—independence—is stalled where
it was twenty-five years ago. Meanwhile, over that same period,
fiduciary duty analysis generally, and the independence inquiry
specifically, have matured and become more nuanced in corporate law.
This is not to say such change always has served investor interests,
and this Article does not make that claim for corporate decisional law.

227. YANKELOVICH, supra note 180, at 137; Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, The
Legal Environments of Organizations, 23 ANN. REV. SOC. 479, 479 (1997). The proposed approach
of heightened judicial attention to the independence factor under section 36(b) is fully consistent
with the findings of Coates & Hubbard, supra note 42, at 205-06, as to the “overall”
competitiveness of the mutual fund industry. Their legal and economic analysis leads them to
conclude that courts under Section 36(b) should continue to assess the role and effectiveness of
fee approvals by disinterested directors. Id. at 55-56. The thesis of this article is that, in doing so,
courts must be more vigilant in ensuring that directors are genuinely independent.
228. Tom Lauricella, Independent Directors Strike Back, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2006, at R1
(describing fund director success in bargaining with advisers for lower fees). Mutual fund culture
may currently be changing in another respect, as well—the increased willingness of mutual
funds to be more “activist” investors, just as public pension funds and other institutional
investors have been doing for some time on various corporate governance issues. See JoAnn S.
Lublin & Phred Dvorak, The Insiders: How Five New Players Aid Movement to Limit CEO Pay,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2007, at A1 (describing increase in assertiveness on governance issues by
Putnam fund trustees); Kaja Whitehouse, The Activist Game: It’s Not Just for Hedgies, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 14, 2007, at C15 (describing increase in mutual fund activism).
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Rather, it is to say that fiduciary analysis in corporate law remains
open textured and adaptive, and, therefore, it has grown and retained
significance over the years. Delaware courts, in short, attend to
fiduciary duty as their unique and valuable contribution to corporate
law. Federal courts address fiduciary duty issues infrequently, and
therefore, they have little practice or expertise with respect to
fiduciary analysis. Moreover, unlike Delaware courts, they receive
little reputational payoff for expertise in the area, and they do not
need to “compete” with other lawmaking jurisdictions. Accordingly,
they appear content in section 36(b) cases to recite woodenly an
approach long abandoned in corporate law. The result is that the allimportant concept of “fiduciary duty” in mutual fund fee litigation is
frozen in 1982, where courts seem happy to leave it. This might not
matter if other market-based forces brought discipline to advisory fees
or if institutional investors pressed directors for tighter scrutiny of
management compensation, as in the corporate world. The absence of
these influences in the mutual fund industry means that regulation,
including both agency rulemaking and fiduciary duty litigation, must
be a more potent disciplinary mechanism.
Although the industry never has been defeated in a section
36(b) case, it nonetheless resists proposed rules requiring an
independent chair and a seventy-five percent majority of independent
directors. Of course, “independence” in the mutual fund lexicon means
something narrower than it does in corporate law. It means
“ostensible independence.” But that difference makes the resistance
more puzzling. Perhaps industry insiders believe that ostensible
independence is an acceptable regulatory outcome but that genuine
independence is not. Genuine independence looks beyond a mere lack
of “interestedness” as defined in the Act and explores business and
other connections between fund directors and advisory and
subadvisory personnel, much as in contemporary corporate law.
Moreover, as Professor Kuhnen concludes genuine independence may
result in lower advisory fees.
Ostensible independence is a social convention that does not
demonstrably lower fees. Consequently, the fund industry can live
with ostensible independence for now. A strategy that resists a policy
initiative aimed at increasing the number of ostensibly independent
directors is a strategy that, even if it loses, successfully can resist
direct government regulation of fees and preserve vast autonomy over
compensation. What really matters, and what the new numerical rules
on independence only approximate, is genuine independence, a
concept that cannot be legislated categorically but only can be
examined—as Delaware corporate law so clearly reveals—on a case-
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by-case basis in particular contexts. Therefore, a political strategy of
resisting the new rules, but then acquiescing or compromising,
provides good cover while still preserving fees.
Investors in mutual funds, following the lead of shareholders in
public corporations,229 could seek to amend fund bylaws to adopt a
stricter definition of “independence.” With respect to section 36(b),
however, only courts can demand genuine independence, rather than
its appearance, from fund directors. By looking to modern corporate
fiduciary discourse for guidance, courts may conclude that some
“disinterested” directors under the Act are not really “independent.”
By refashioning independence—which is, after all, a Gartenberg
factor—to be more contemporary and central to their analysis, courts
are unlikely to open the floodgates of litigation. They probably will
disqualify some fund directors from the “independent” category.
Perhaps that will give investors a few victories under section 36(b),
thereby making derivative litigation a more “serviceable mechanism”
for attaining accountability.230 More importantly, that first win or two
may motivate both advisers and fund directors to adopt a stricter,
more appropriate definition of independence for director selection
purposes. That, in turn, may begin to inculcate a healthier norm and
culture of genuine independence in the mutual fund industry, to the
good of investors.

229. Lublin & Dvorak, supra note 228 (describing bylaw amendments as one technique for
increased investor voice on governance issues).
230. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 1043.
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Appendix A
The thirty decisions citing the Gartenberg independence factor,
all of which also cite the “substantially disproportionate” language,
are as follows:
Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors, Inc., 464 F.3d 338 (2d
Cir. 2006); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th
Cir. 2001); Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir.
1989); In re Scudder Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 1921 (DAB),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59643 (D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2007); Gallus v.
Ameriprise Fin., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Minn. 2007); Jones v. Harris
Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13352 (D. Ill. Feb.
27, 2007); In re Evergreen Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 240 F.R.D. 115
(D.N.Y. 2007); Sins v. Janus Capital Mgmt., LLC, Civ. A. No. 04-cv01647-WDM-MEH, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90673 (D. Colo. Dec. 15,
2006); Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 60858 (D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006); Hunt v. Invesco Funds
Group, Civ. A. No. H-04-02555, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40944 (D. Tex.
June 5, 2006); In re AllianceBernstein Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litig.,
No. 04 Civ. 4885 (SWK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 939 (D.N.Y. Jan. 11,
2006); In re AllianceBernstein Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litig., No. 04
Civ. 4885 (SWK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24263 (D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005);
In re Columbia Entities Litig., Civ. A. No. 04-11704-REK, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 33439 (D. Mass. Nov. 30, 2005); Yameen v. Eaton Vance
Distribs., 394 F. Supp. 2d 350 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Dreyfus Mut.
Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Pa. 2005); Gallus v. Am.
Express Fin. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Minn. 2005); Pfeiffer v.
Bjurman, Barry & Assocs., No. 03 Civ. 9741 (DLC), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16924 (D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2004); Benak v. Alliance Capital Mgmt.
L.P., Civ. A. No. 01-5734, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12231 (D.N.J. Feb. 9,
2004); Miller v. Mitchell Hutchins Asset Mgmt., Inc., No. 01-CV-0192DRH, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27675 (D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2002); Strougo v.
Bea Assocs., 188 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D.N.Y. 2002); Green v. Nuveen
Advisory Corp., No. 97 C 5255, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14047 (D. Ill.
Sept. 6, 2001); Krantz v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research, Co., 98 F. Supp.
2d 150 (D. Mass. 2000); Migdal v. Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l,
Inc., Civ. No. AMD 98-2162, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22853 (D. Md.
Mar. 20, 2000); Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. L.L.C., 77 F.
Supp. 2d 559 (D.N.J. 1999); Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt.,
Inc., No. 98 Civ. 4673 (WK), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10892 (D.N.Y. July
16, 1999); Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d
256 (D.N.Y. 1999); Strougo ex rel. Brazil Fund v. Scudder, Stevens &
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Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.Y. 1997); Kalish v. Franklin
Advisers, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1222 (D.N.Y. 1990); Krinsk v. Fund Asset
Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.Y. 1988); Schuyt v. Rowe Price
Prime Reserve Fund, 663 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.Y. 1987).
The sixteen decisions involving motions to dismiss that were
granted are as follows:
In re Scudder Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 1921 (DAB),
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59643 (D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2007); In re Evergreen
Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 240 F.R.D. 115 (D.N.Y. 2007); Sins v. Janus
Capital Mgmt., LLC, Civ. A. No. 04-cv-01647-WDM-MEH, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 90673 (D. Colo. Dec. 15, 2006); In re AllianceBernstein
Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 4885 (SWK), 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 939 (D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006); In re Columbia Entities Litig.,
Civ. A. No. 04-11704-REK, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33439 (D. Mass.
Nov. 30, 2005); Yameen v. Eaton Vance Distribs., 394 F. Supp. 2d 350
(D. Mass. 2005); Benak v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., Civ. A. No. 015734, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12231 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2004); Miller v.
Mitchell Hutchins Asset Mgmt., Inc., No. 01-CV-0192-DRH, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27675 (D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2002); Strougo v. Bea Assocs., 188
F. Supp. 2d 373 (D.N.Y. 2002); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l,
Inc., Civ. No. AMD 98-2162, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22853 (D. Md.
Mar. 20, 2000); Krantz v. Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. L.L.C., 77 F.
Supp. 2d 559 (D.N.J. 1999); Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt.,
Inc., No. 98 Civ. 4673 (WK), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10892 (D.N.Y. July
16, 1999); Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d
256 (D.N.Y. 1999); Strougo ex rel. Brazil Fund v. Scudder, Stevens &
Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783 (D.N.Y. 1997); Kalish v. Franklin
Advisers, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1222 (D.N.Y. 1990); Krinsk v. Fund Asset
Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.Y. 1988).
The six decisions involving motions to dismiss that were
granted in part and denied in part are as follows:
Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 60858 (D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006); In re AllianceBernstein
Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 4885 (SWK), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24263 (D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005); In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds
Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Pa. 2005); Gallus v. Am. Express
Fin. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d 862 (D. Minn. 2005); Pfeiffer v. Bjurman,
Barry & Assocs., No. 03 Civ. 9741 (DLC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16924
(D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2004); Krantz v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research, Co., 98
F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Mass. 2000).
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The single decision denying a motion to dismiss was Hunt v.
Invesco Funds Group, Civ. A. No. H-04-02555, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40944 (D. Tex. June 5, 2006).
The three decisions granting motions for summary judgment
are as follows:
Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Minn. 2007);
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13352 (D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007); Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., No. 97
C 5255, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14047 (D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2001).
The single decision on the merits for the defendant was Schuyt
v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, 663 F. Supp. 962 (D.N.Y. 1987).
The single decision granting a motion to reconsider was In re
AllianceBernstein Mut. Fund Excessive Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 4885
(SWK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 939 (D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2006).
The three decisions involving motions to dismiss that were
affirmed on appeal are as follows:
Amron v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisors, Inc., 464 F.3d 338 (2d
Cir. 2006); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir.
2001); Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1989).
The forty-nine decisions mentioning the “substantially
disproportionate” language but not discussing independence are as
follows:
Bellikoff v. Eaton Vance Corp., 481 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2007);
Verkouteren v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt., Inc., No. 99-9005, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4487 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 2000); Levy v. Alliance Capital
Mgmt. L.P., No. 98-9528, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20213 (2d Cir. Aug.
20, 1999); Meyer v. Oppenheimer Management Corp., 895 F.2d 861
(2d Cir. 1990); Meyer v. Oppenheimer Management Corp., 764 F.2d 76
(2d Cir. 1985); Alexander v. Member Cases Allianz Dresdner Asset
Mgmt. of Amer. Holding, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Conn. 2007); In
re Franklin Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 677 (D.N.J. 2007);
Fitzgerald v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 4305 (DAB), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15365 (D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2007); Mintz v. Baron, No. 05 Civ. 4904
(LTS)(HBP), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66867 (D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2006);
Everett v. Bozic, No. 05 Civ. 00296 (DAB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55824 (D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006); In re Salomon Smith Barney Mut. Fund
Fees Litig., 441 F. Supp. 2d 579 (D.N.Y. 2006); In re Merrill Lynch
Inv. Mgmt. Funds Sec. Litig., 434 F. Supp. 2d 233 (D.N.Y. 2006); In re
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Mut. Funds Inv. Litig. v. Deutsche Bank AG, 437 F. Supp. 2d 449 (D.
Md. 2006); In re Morgan Stanley & Van Kampen Mut. Fund Sec.
Litig., No. 03 Civ. 8208 (RO), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20758 (D.N.Y.
Apr. 14, 2006); In re Oppenheimer Funds Fees Litig., 426 F. Supp. 2d
157 (D.N.Y. 2006); In re Evergreen Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 423 F.
Supp. 2d 249 (D.N.Y. 2006); Dumond v. Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Civ. A.
No. 04-11458-GAO, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1933 (D. Mass. Jan. 19,
2006); Forsythe v. Sun Life Fin., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D. Mass.
2006); In re Goldman Sachs Mut. Funds Fee Litig., No. 04 Civ. 2567
(NRB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1542 (D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2006); In re Eaton
Vance Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 403 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D.N.Y. 2005);
Brever v. Federated Equity Mgmt. Co., 233 F.R.D. 429 (D. Pa. 2005);
Stegall v. Ladner, 394 F. Supp. 2d 358 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Davis
Selected Mut. Funds Litig., No. 04 Civ. 4186 (MGC), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23203 (D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2005); In re Eaton Vance Mut. Funds
Fee Litig., 380 F. Supp. 2d 222 (D.N.Y. 2005); ING Principal Prot.
Funds Derivative Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D. Mass. 2005); Gilliam
v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., Civ. A. No. 04-11600-NG, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10478 (D. Mass. 2005); Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., No.
04 C 8305, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39560 (D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2005); Wicks v.
Putnam Inv. Mgmt.. LLP, Civ. A. No. 04-10988-GAO, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4892 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2005); Strigliabotti v. Franklin Res.,
Inc., No. C 04-00883 SI, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9625 (D. Cal. Mar. 7,
2005); Lieber v. Invesco Funds Group, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 852 (D.
Tex. 2005); Zucker v. Aim Advisors, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Tex.
2005); Yampolsky v. Morgan Stanley Inv. Advisers Inc., No. 03 Civ.
5710 (RO), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8573 (D.N.Y. May 11, 2004);
Millenco L.P. v. meVC Advisors, Inc., Civ. A. No. 02-142-JJF, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19512 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2002); Rohrbaugh v. Inv. Co.
Inst., Civ. A. No. 00-1237, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13401 (D.D.C. July
2, 2002); Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 147 F. Supp. 2d 318
(D.N.J. 2001); Strougo v. BEA Assocs., No. 98 Civ. 3725 (RWS), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 346 (D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2000); Strougo v. BEA Assocs.,
No. 98 Civ. 3725 (RWS), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3021 (D.N.Y. Mar. 11,
1999); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming, Case No. AMD 98-2162, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22001 (D. Md. Jan. 20, 1999); Levy v. Alliance
Capital Mgmt. L.P., No. 97 Civ. 4672 (DC), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16749 (D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1998); Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 19 F.
Supp. 2d 227 (D.N.J. 1998); King v. Douglass, 973 F. Supp. 707 (D.
Tex. 1996); In re TCW/DW N. Am. Gov’t Income Trust Sec. Litig., 941
F. Supp. 326 (D.N.Y. 1996); Langner v. Brown, 913 F. Supp. 260
(D.N.Y. 1996); Olesh v. Dreyfus Corp., No. CV-94-1664 (CPS), 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21421 (D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1995); Wexler v. Equitable
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Capital Mgmt. Corp., No. 93 Civ. 3834 (RPP), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1651 (D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 1994); Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt. Corp., 715
F. Supp. 574 (D.N.Y. 1989); Meyer for Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt.
Corp., 707 F. Supp. 1394 (D.N.Y. 1988); Meyer v. Oppenheimer Mgmt.
Corp., 691 F. Supp. 669 (D.N.Y. 1988); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Ill. 1987).
The only section 36(b) decision from the D. C. Circuit is
Rohrbaugh v. Inv. Co. Inst., Civ. A. No. 00-1237, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13401 (D.D.C. July 2, 2002).
The decisions in the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits that
follow Gartenberg are as follows:
Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir.
2001); Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., 497 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Minn. 2007);
Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. C 05-04518 WHA, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21935 (D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2007); In re Am. Mut. Funds Fee Litig.,
Case No. CV-04-5593 GAF (RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8276 (D.
Cal. Jan. 17, 2007); Gallus v. Am. Express Fin. Corp., 370 F. Supp. 2d
862 (D. Minn. 2005); Strigliabotti v. Franklin Res., Inc., No. C 0400883 SI, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9625 (D. Cal. Mar.7, 2005); Migdal v.
Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc., Civ. No. AMD 98-2162, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22853 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2000); Batra v. Investors Research
Corp., 144 F.R.D. 97 (D. Mo. 1992).
The decisions in the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits that refer to Gartenberg are as follows:
Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 295 F.3d 738 (7th Cir. 2002);
Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 286 F.3d 682 (3d Cir. 2002); Romano
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 834 F.2d 523 (5th Cir.
1987); In re Franklin Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 478 F. Supp. 2d 677
(D.N.J. 2007); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13352 (D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007); Sins v. Janus Capital
Mgmt., LLC, Civ. A. No. 04-cv-01647-WDM-MEH, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 90673 (D. Colo. Dec. 15, 2006); Hunt v. Invesco Funds Group,
Civ. A. No. H-04-02555, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40944 (D. Tex. June 5,
2006); Dumond v. Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Civ. A. No. 04-11458-GAO,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1933 (D. Mass. Jan. 19, 2006); Forsythe v. Sun
Life Fin., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 100 (D. Mass. 2006); In re Columbia
Entities Litig., Civ. A. No. 04-11704-REK, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
33439 (D. Mass. Nov. 30, 2005); Stegall v. Ladner, 394 F. Supp. 2d 358
(D. Mass. 2005); Yameen v. Eaton Vance Distribs., 394 F. Supp. 2d
350 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Dreyfus Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 428 F. Supp.
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2d 342 (D. Pa. 2005); Jacobs v. Bremner, 378 F. Supp. 2d 861 (D. Ill.
2005); ING Principal Prot. Funds Derivative Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d
163 (D. Mass. 2005); Gilliam v. Fid. Mgmt. & Research Co., Civ. A. No.
04-11600-NG, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10478 (D. Mass. May 3, 2005);
Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
39560 (D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2005); Wicks v. Putnam Inv. Mgmt. LLP, Civ. A.
No. 04-10988-GAO, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4892 (D. Mass. Mar. 28,
2005); Lieber v. Invesco Funds Group, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 852 (D.
Tex. 2005); Zucker v. Aim Advisors, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Tex.
2005); Benak v. Alliance Capital Mgmt. L.P., Civ. A. No. 01-5734, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12231 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2004); Millenco L.P. v. meVC
Advisors, Inc., Civ. A. No. 02-142-JJF, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19512
(D. Del. Aug. 21, 2002); Miller v. Mitchell Hutchins Asset Mgmt., Inc.,
No. 01-CV-0192-DRH, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27675 (D. Ill. Mar. 12,
2002); Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., No. 97 C 5255, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14047 (D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2001); Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P.,
147 F. Supp. 2d 318 (D.N.J. 2001); Krantz v. Fidelity Mgmt. &
Research, Co., 98 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Mass. 2000); Krantz v.
Prudential Invs. Fund Mgmt. L.L.C., 77 F. Supp. 2d 559 (D.N.J. 1999);
Green v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 19 F. Supp. 2d 227 (D.N.J. 1998);
King v. Douglass, 973 F. Supp. 707 (D. Tex. 1996); In re Nuveen Fund
Litig., Case No. 94 C 360, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8071 (D. Ill. June 5,
1996); Kamen v. Kemper Financial Servs., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1153 (D.
Ill. 1987).

